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The  paper  analyzes  bank  loan  supply  in  a  simple  value  maxmuzmg  partial 
equilibrium framework. The focus is on the role of bank capital, capital regulation 
and the pricing of bank liabilities. The model is constructed so as to resemble the 
situation of  the Finnish local banks in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, particularly 
with regard to capital regulation which changed subtantially during this period. While 
equity  capital  is  assumed  exogenous,  the  bank  may  choose  the  amount  of 
subordinated debt which also counts as regulatory capital. The model shows that bank 
characteristics matter for loan supply, when the bank is penalized for bank failure 
(capital insufficiency relative to a regulatory requirement). When this  penalty is 
positive, fair or excessive pricing (lemons premium) of  bank liabilities makes bank 
lending depend positively on bank capital but underpricing results in a negative 
relationship.  A  negative  relationship  may  also  emerge  if the  bank  anticipates 
"perverse" bank support policies ie. that capital insufficiency will be  rewarded with 
transfers from the authorities. Thus both a credit crunch due to lack of capital and 
"excessive"  risky  lending  due  to  moral  hazard  can  obtain  in  a  single  model, 
depending on the circumstances. The precise  nature of capital regulation is  not 
important, provided a failure to meet the requirement is sufficiently penalized. The 
model suggests that  the mutually exclusive hypotheses of credit crunch / excessive 
lending due to moral hazard  can be tested not only by examining the relationship 
between bank lending on the one hand and bank equity and  bank costs on the other 
hand, but also by examining the relationship of subordinated debt with bank lending 
and the capital ratio. 
Keywords: bank lending, capital, capital regulation, moral hazard, credit crunch 
Tiivistelma 
Paperissa analysoidaan pankin luotontaIjontaa yksinkertaisessa arvon maksimointiin 
perustuvassa osittaisen tasapainon kehikossa. Paahuomio kiinnitetaan pankin oman 
paaoman, paaomasaantelyn ja pankin velkojen hinnoittelun vaikutuksiin. Malli on ra-
kennettu pitaen silmalla suomalaisten paikallispankkien tilannetta 1980-luvun lopulla 
ja 1990-luvun alussa, erityisesti tal loin voimakkaasti muuttuneen paaomasaantelyn 
osalta. Pankin varsinainen oma paaoma oletetaan eksogeeniseksi, mutta pankki voi 
valita paaomasaannostelyssa paaomaksi luettavan vastuudebentuurirahoituksen maa-
ran. Malli osoittaa, etta pankin ominaisuudet vaikuttavat luotontaIjontaan, kun pankin 
3 paaoman riittamattomyydesta seuraa rangaistus. Kun tama rangaistus on positiivinen, 
pankin velkojen reilu hinnoittelu tai ylihinnoittelu (riskipreemio) johtaa positiiviseen 
relaatioon pankin oman paaoman ja  luotonannon valilla ja alihinnoittelu johtaa nega-
tiiviseen riippuvuuteen. Negatiivinen riippuvuus voi syntya myos, jos pankki odottaa 
viranomaisten "palkitsevan" paaomavaatimuksen alittamisen varallisuuden siirtoa 
merkitsevalla pankkituella. Yksi ja  sama malli tuottaa siten olosuhteista riippuen paa-
oman puutteesta aiheutuvan luottolamanja moral hazardista aiheutuvan riskipitoisten 
luottojen liiallisen myontamisen. Paaomasaantelyn muodolla ei ole suurta merkitysta 
edellyttaen, etta paaomavaatimuksen alittamisesta seuraa riittava rangaistus. Keske-
naan ristiriitaisia hypoteeseja paaoman puutteesta aiheutuvasta luottolamasta ja moral 
hazardin aiheuttamasta liiallisesta luotonannosta voidaan mallin perusteella testata 
paitsi suoraan tutkimalla luotonannon ja pankin paaoman seka kustannusten valisia 
yhteyksia myos tarkastelemalla yhteyksia vastuudebentuurien ja  pankin luotonannon 
laajuuden seka paaomasuhteen valilla. 
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5 1  Introduction 
The general  objective  of this  paper  is  to  explore  theoretical  reasons  for  bank: 
behaviour that may have contributed to the credit cycle of  the Finnish Economy since 
the mid-1980s. By contribution is meant the role of banks' credit supply behaviour 
which may have made supply of credit in some sense "excessive" in the aftermath of 
financial liberalization in the late 1980s and "too small" in the the early 1990s. The 
benchmark is a situation in which credit growth is determined simply by the return 
of the projects to be financed and "the rate of interest" ie. a situation where bank 
behaviour or bank characteristics do not play any role. In this benchmark situation 
banks are simply a passive veil. 
Several broad stories exist in the literature to explain why bank behaviour may 
matter, and in particular why it may vary in such a way as observed in the Finnish 
credit cycle. Most of them give a central role for bank capital or net worth. 
As  discussed  in  VihriaIa  (1996),  a  large  literature  based  on  asymmetric 
information argues that the firm net worth affects the cost and availability of external 
financing of any firm. Thus weak bank capital may force banks to restrain lending as 
re-financing becomes increasingly expensive or cannot be found at all due to lemons 
premia. Bankruptcy costs or "costs of financial distress" may also have the same 
effect even under symmetric information, although the size of such costs probably 
cannot be assumed high in the absence of  informational asymmetries. These "market-
based"  capital  effects  may  be reinforced by capital  regulation  imposed by the 
authorities. As a consequence, depleation of bank capital, say due to credit losses, 
may lead to a "credit crunch" or more specifically "capital crunch", which has been 
claimed to have contributed to the credit slow  down in several countries, particularly 
in the United States in the early 1990s. Bank lending thus turns out too small relative 
to a frictionless Modigliani  - Miller world. 
Bank capital playes an important but rather different role also in one of the 
leading explanations for potential excessive risky lending by the banks. Under limited 
liability the value of  bank equity can be increased by increasing the riskiness of bank 
assets provided the cost of bank liabilities does not respond sufficiently to  the 
increased credit risk. Starting with Merton (1977), flat-rate deposit insurance has 
been considered an important source of underpricing of bank funding and therefore 
of  "moral hazard" incentives. The smaller bank: capital or net worth to begin with, the 
greater are these incentives. Thus although underpricing of bank liabilities is the 
fundamental cause of excessive risk taking, the amount of capital greatly affects the 
size of  the problem.  Many accounts of the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s in the 
United States name moral hazard as a reason for the rapid growth of the - ex post 
highly unprofitable - thrift lending to real estate businesses. 
Another widely cited cause for variation in the banks' loan supply behaviour is 
competition. Fear for excessive competition which would threaten the survival of 
individual banks and the stability of the financial system as  a whole has in fact 
motivated much of the regulation (including the aforementioned deposit insurance 
and restrictions on entry) applied to financial institutions since the 1930s. In part 
change in the degree  of competition is  seen to  work through the moral hazard 
mechanism noted above.  When competition in  the  financial  markets  increases, 
margins in  financial intermeadition decrease, lowering the net worth of financial 
institutions. Keeley (1990) among others argues that the banks' "charter value" ie. the 
7 economic rent associated with banking licence decreased as a result of increased 
competition in the 1980s among different types of  financial institutions and that this 
led to increased risk taking by many American banks. 
But competition may affect loan supply behaviour in other ways as welL One 
idea is that competition may lead the banks to pay too little attention to borrower 
quality. Banks' efforts to screen borrowers may be reduced by increased competition 
as the benefits from screening decline with more competition. But it is not at all clear 
that less information gathering necessarily means more risky lending. As Broecker 
(1990) shows, the lesser profitability of screening due to increased competition may 
in fact make lenders more conservative in their lending policies in fear of what is 
called the "winner's curse". 
Some further ideas about the role of  bank competition pay no explicit attention 
to credit risk but rely on changes in strategic behaviour. In particular, it has been 
claimed that liberalization of  financial regulation induces additional competition, as 
the banks attempt to capture market shares early on in the expanding market, see e.g. 
Vives (1991). It  has been also argued that independently of any regulatory changes, 
monopolistic competition can lead to price wars in times of high demand, as  the 
benefits from aggressive pricing relate to a larger-than-average overall demand while 
the retaliation of the competitors will have an effect at a later stage of more normal 
demand.l 
Conflicts of  interest between bank management and bank owners may also result 
in excessive risk taking which can take the form of  highly expansionary risky lending. 
Managers of  poor ability may be induced to take excessive risks in order to keep their 
positions. Gorton and Rosen (1995) provide a model in which such incentives are 
strongest when external conditions are adverse, just a as in the standard moral hazard 
case, where weakening profitability increases gains from a gamble for resurrection. 
But it may be argued that lending may exceed the value maximizing level also in 
buoyant market conditions, when displaying bad profitability would more likely be 
interpreted as a proof of managent inability than in more difficult circumstances.2 
A totally different view from all arguments above is to emphasize the potential 
"irrationality"  or "bounded rationality"  of economic  agents.  Most prominently 
Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger (1982) argue that the actions of economic agents 
including bankers are to a large extent determined by such psykological factors as 
"optimism", "euphoria" and "pessimism". Herd behaviour also maybe characteristic 
for decision making in such situations. Thus it may be argued that the rapid growth 
of  lending following liberalization was at least partly fuelled by highly optimistic -
and in retrospect false - expectations about asset prices etc., and similarily the 
contraction of credit later on was at least partly due to pessimism. However, these 
types of arguments are extremely difficult if not impossible to test with any real 
economy data: suitable assumptions about expectations may rationalize all kinds of 
patterns of observed variables. 
This paper focuses on the role of bank capital, capital regulation and pricing of 
bank liabilities. On the one hand, the aim is to illustrate how bank lending can be 
both too expansionary and too small relative to a Modigliani-Miller situation within 
a simple model depending on the precice assumptions about the pricing of bank 
I  Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). 
2 Rajan (1994). 
8 liabilities and the penalties associated with bank default. On the other hand, the aim 
is to develope testable implications of the "excessive lending due to moral hazard" 
and "credit crunch due to capital insufficiency" hypotheses applicaple to Finnish 
banking since 1985. 
The analysis will be conducted in a simple static framework which assumes 
value maximization as  the  objective of the banking firm.  The simplicity of the 
framework  allows  using  a relatively rich liability structure  and  incorporating  a 
reasonably realistic capital regulation while keeping the comparative statics largely 
unambiguous.  The  assumptions  of  the  model  are  made  with  regard  to  the 
characteristics of the Finnish savings and cooperative banks in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, as data on these banks will be used in the subsequent empirical analyses. 
The paper is organized as follows. The basic assumptions of the model are laid 
down and discussed in sections 2.  In section 3 the returns of the relevant financial 
claims  for  the  optimization problem are  computed.  The case of fair  pricing of 
marginal funding with a liability side capital regulation is analyzed in section 4 while 
the cases of underpricing or overpricing are analyzed in section 5. Section 6 shows 
how the model works with an asset side capital regulation. Finally the main results 
are  summarized in section 7.  In that last section we  also  present some specific 
implications of the model for explaining the Finnish credit cycle. 
2  The basic assumptions of the model 
We take as the point of  departure the so-called Klein-Monti model of  bank behaviour 
augmented with credit risk (Klein 1971). Such a model has been used ego by Dermine 
(1984, 1986). It  is thus assumed that the bank (owner/manager) maximizes the value 
of equity or expected end-of-period net worth. Also the providers of  funds to the bank 
are assumed risk-neutral. 
The asset and liability structure is constructed so as  to embody the essential 
features of the Finnish savings and cooperative banks. 
The basic assumptions are as follows: 
(i)  Bank balance sheet: L + B =  K + D + S + M, 
where  L =  loan(s) to risky investment project(s) 
B =  riskless bonds 
K = equity capital (exogenous) 
S =  subordinated debt 
D =  (core) deposits (exogenous) 
M =  money market debt or other senior debt 
Assuming equity capital  to  be  exogeneous  in  the  static  setting  is  a  very  close 
approximation of the situation of the Finnish saving and cooperative banks. Until 
1991, the savings banks had in practice no instruments to augment equity capital, 
9 equity could be added only through retained earnings.3 Since 1991, the savings banks 
have  been  allowed  to  issue  "basic  fund  shares"  and  the  cooperative  banks 
"investment  shares"  which  are  counted  as  equity.  Their  importance  has  been 
miniscule, however. 
Instead, the banks have been able to  issue  freely  subordinated debt,  which 
functions as a cushion vis-a-vis any senior debt in the case of insolvency. Up to a 
limit, as will explained later, subordinated debt also counts as regulatory capital. 
Senior debt is divided here into exogenous "deposits" and endogenous "money 
market debt" (or other senior debt). The former is assumed to represent the retail 
deposits that the banks may obtain, owing ego  to tax priviledges and full deposit 
insurance, at so low rates that all such deposits are accepted under all circumstances. 
Although the Finnish regulations have varied over time, the rates on tax  -exempt 
transactions and time deposits have been constrained clearly below market rates by 
law. The underpring of these so-called core deposits represents a priviledge given for 
the banking firms by legislation. It can be said to create "charter value" to the firms 
licenced to do banking business. 
In contrast, the rest of senior debt is assumed to be available at posted rates or 
posted marginal cost at or above the bond rate. Such funds are denoted by M and 
called money market debt. In the Finnish context this item contains, apart from true 
money market debt in the form of  certificates of  deposits (CD's), interbank borrowing 
and possibly also taxable time deposits. 
It is assumed that D is senior to M in the case of bankruptcy. This is not strictly 
according to the Finnish legislation but simplifies the analysis somewhat without 
distorting the qualitative results. 
(ii)  Interest rates and returns: 
L:  R(L) = 1 + r(L) is the contract rate. It is assumed that the marginal 
contractual revenue MR  ==  a(R(L)L)laL is diminishing in L due to 
local or temporary monopoly power. This rather standard assumption 
in  this  type  of models  can  be  rationalized  for  example  by  the 
monopoly power created by informational advantages of customer 
relationships, see ego Rajan (1992). 
a is  a stochastic return on the fixed-size project financed by the 
bank loan, with d.f. f(a) and c.d.fF(a) known by all agents. The lower 
and upper bounds of the return distribution are denoted by amin  and 
amax• 
The structure implies that the bigger L,  the larger the set of the 
realizations of the project returns, where the firm does not meet the 
contractual commitment and the bank incurs a credit loss. In particular 
the ratio of credit losses over the contractual commitment increases 
with loan volume, mimicing the empirical findings of Solttila and 
Vihrilila (1994). 
3  The significance of  cooperative capital as a source of  equity was very small also for the cooperative 
banks; furthermore, the right ofthe members of a cooperative to withdraw their share of cooperative 
capital under certain circumstances makes that instrument questionable as equity that could be used 
to cover losses. 
10 Rather than interpreting the project outcome literally it might be 
better regarded  as  the  value  of the  loan customers'  collaterizable 
wealth. 
B:  RB is exogenous constant 
K:  residual claim 
S:  RS is determined so as to make the expected return on an investment 
in S, E(RsS), equal to the return on an investment of the same size in 
the  safe  asset B. The posted rate,  which is  greater than  or (in  a 
degenerated case) equal to the bond rate, is thus fair from the point of 
view of a risk neutral investor. 
D:  RD < RM is exogenous constant. Apart from representing the average 
cost of the exogenous cheap funds,  RD  may be interpreted as  any 
exogenous cost element that is independent of other liabilities. 
M:  The posted rate RM is assumed to be equal to or greater than the bond 
rate. In one version of the model, RM is assumed to determined just as 
RS ie. to make the expected return on an investment in M equal to that 
of a bond portfolio of the same size. Apart from this fair pricing of  M, 
also the version is analyzed where RM (.)  is a fixed non-decreasing 
function of M.  The fixed cost schedule can reflect rather different 
underlying  assumptions.  On  the  one  hand,  a  relatively  flat  such 
schedule could be consistent  with  an  assumption  of an  implicit 
creditor protection (or if  M is interpreted as time deposits also flat rate 
explicit deposit insurance). On the other hand, a steeply rising cost 
schedule could stand in for a rapidly rising lemons premium associated 
with (unmodelled) asymmetric information about bank behaviour. 
(iii)  Capital adequacy regulation: 
Prior to 1991, the Finnish banks were required to have capital equal to at 
least 4  per cent (commercial banks)  or 2  per cent (savings  banks and 
cooperative banks) of total liabilities (excluding some specific items) and 
half of the off-balance sheet commitments. Subordinated debt was among 
the items subtracted from the liability base and could be counted as capital 
up to 50 per cent of the proper capital. Since 1991  the regulations have 
required (along the lines of the BIS recommendations) the banks to have 
capital at least 8 per cent of the risk-weighted assets and off-balance-sheet 
commitments.  Again  certain  types  of  debt  instruments,  including 
subordinated debt, can be counted as regulatory capital. Risk-weighting was 
tightened and some other adjustments were made as of 1994. 
There are in principle several ways of introducing capital constraints into 
the analysis. The simplest thing is to set an ex ante constraint in the form 
K > keD + M) or K > kL. That is what for instance Peek and Rosengren 
(1994)  do  in  their  credit  crunch  analysis.  This  is  nevertheless  rather 
unsatisfactory, as it does not take into account the possibility that banks may 
11 sometimes fail to fulfil the requirement and the regulation is enforced with 
different degrees of strictness. 
A more natural way of introducing the capital regulation is to postulate 
a non-pecuniary cost to the bank (owners/managers) in the case of non-
fulfilment  of the  requirement.  Direct  empirical  counterparts  of such 
penalties could be the costs associated with law suits for negligence and 
prohibition of further banking activities on the part of  the management, and 
exclusion of  the owners from a potentially privileged banking market (with 
a positive charter value). Here it is assumed that this cost is proportional 
(coefficient c ~ 1) to the shortfall of  the regulatory bank capital (the sum of 
net worth and subordinated debt) from the required level (fraction k of the 
base).  Thus  with  the  pre-1991  rules  the cost of non-fulfilment of the 
requirement can be written: c(k(RDD + RMM) - (a + RBB  - RDD - RMM-
RSS + RSS)). The capital with which the bank meet the requirement consists 
thus of bank net worth and the value of subordinated debt which will be 
counted towards  regulatory capital up to  a  given  maximum  smax.  This 
regulatory  cost is  incurred  when  the  project  outcome  a  falls  short  of 
ak  ==  (1 + k)(RDD + RMM) - RBB. 
The cost  c  can be interpreted  as  the  product of the  probability of 
inspection of capital adequacy and the penalty imposed in the case of non-
performance. The value c = 1 would correspond unlimited liability in the 
sense that the cost would be equal to a capital injection sufficient to make 
the bank just meet the regulatory constraint in every state of world. The 
value c = 0 represents the case of  no effective capital regulation. Finally, one 
may even contemplate a perverse case with c < 0, if a failure to meet the 
capital requirement is rewarded by government bank support say in the form 
of subsidized loans, purchaces  of assets  at inflated prices,  injection of 
capital etc. 
The above formulation corresponds to that of Dermine (1984). However, 
in his model the treshold for the project return is set at the point where the 
bank is just able to meet its contractual commitments (k = 0), and Dermine 
gives these costs the interpretation of bankruptcy costs. If  by bankruptcy 
cost is meant administrative costs and the reduction of the value of a firm's 
assets in liquidition, such costs should reduce the value of the claims of the 
creditors, ie. the costs ought to be pecuniary rather than non-pecuniary, as 
here. In that sense a bankruptcy cost interpretation would seem somewhat 
questionable. 
Here  the·  penalty  is  interpreted  in  the  first  place  as  a  regulatory 
punishement by the authorities. As such the non-pecuniary nature of the 
penalty would seem quite appropriate.4 On the other hand, sticking strictly 
to a regulatory cost interpretation may be unnecessarily narrow. The banks 
which fail to meet the capital adequacy standards may in fact be penalized 
also by the "market" even in the absence of  a bankruptcy. For managers loss 
of reputation may be a significant factor. Uncertainty about the value and 
fate of the bank failing a capital requirement may temporarily hamper the 
4 Also Passmore and Sharpe (1994) utilize the idea of non-pecuniary costs imposed on the owners to 
introduce capital constraints. However, in their model the cost is made proportional to the loan stock 
rather than the amount of capital shortfall, as would seem natural. 
12 bank's possibilities to conduct business and make the equity stake illiquid 
for a while even if the bank need not in the end be reorganized in a way 
which creates dead weight costs. 
One can postulate an analogous cost of capital insufficiency to depict 
the current (as of 1991) capital regulation. In this case the threshhold for the 
project return is ak  :: kRL + RDD + RMM - RBB. 
It is reasonable to assume that the bank must meet the capital requirement 
always ex ante ie. that the supervisors would not allow a bank to operate if 
the contractual loan rate were so small that the bank were sure to fail the 
capital regulation. 
(iv)  Simplifying assumptions:  ignorance of the reserve requirement and the 
premium for deposit insurance 
In order to simplify the presentation, two typical features of this type of 
models  are  left  out:  the  reserve  requirement  and  deposits  insurance 
premium. The former would in our setting be a tax on reservable deposits, 
and their effects can be analyzed by altering the exogenous cost of such 
funds. 
Similarly the existing flat-rate deposit insurance premium levied on the 
balance sheet total would be very easy to incorporate by simply postulating 
that the bank has to pay an ex ante tax of the size p(L + B). However, as 
long  as  it is  flat  rate  (as  in Finland)  it does  not have  any  interesting 
implications, and it left out of the analysis. 
3  The returns on various claims 
Given the seniority structure of  the various claims on the bank, the returns contingent 
on the project outcome a are with the pre-1991 capital regulation as follows: 
Return on S 
j
R sS,  when  a~as::RsS +RDD+RMM-RBB 
a +  R BB - R DD - R MM,  a s>a  ~ a M:: R DD +  R MM - R BB 




R MM,  when  a:z.aM 
a + R BB - R DD,  a M> a :z. aD == R DD - R BB 




R DD,  when 
a, 
(3) 
Return on K 
RL+RBB -RSS -RMM -RDD  when  a:z.RL  , 
(1 +k)(RDD + R MM) - R BB  (4) 
a + RBB - R Ss - R MM - R DD -c(ak-a),  aS:o; a<ak 
-c(ak-a),  a<aS 
Note that as < ak is equivalent to the requirement that RSS < k(RDD + RMM), i.e. that 
subordinated debt never can meet the capital requirement alone. Given the constraint 
that subordinated debt can be counted as regulatory capital only up to 50 per cent of 
the core capital K, this condition is always fulfilled when subordinated debt is needed 
for capital adequacy reasons. 
Expected returns 
The expected return of subordinated debt is 
amax  as 
E(R  sS) =  f R sSf(a)da + f (a + R BB - R DD - R MM)f(a)da.  (5) 
as 
as 
Adding and subtracting  R Ss f f(a)da  and integrating by parts  allowes  (5)  to be 
written as 
14 as 
E(R  SS) =  R Ss - f F(a)da.  (6) 
aM 
Equating (6) with the return on a safe investment ofthe same size yields the condition 
for the fair pricing of subordinated debt 
as 
RSS =RBS + fF(a)da.  (7) 
aM 
In (7) the second term of the RHS is the required default premium, which is a highly 
nonlinear function of the portfolio composition. 
Similarily one obtains the rule for the fair pricing of money market debt 
aM 
R MM =  R BM + f F(  a)da.  (8) 
aD 
It is easy to see that (7) and (8) imply the following bounds for the fair posted rates 
(9) 
(10) 
As one would expect, the fair posted rate is higher for subordinated debt than for 
money market debt. If  there is no risk that the bank defaults on money market debt 
or subordinated debt ie. F(aM) = F(as) = 0, the posted rates naturally collapse into the 
safe bond rate. 
In the same fashion the expected value of equity K 
amax 
E(V) = f (RL + RBB - R Ss - RMM - R DD)f(a)da 
RL 
RL 
+ f (a+RBB -RsS -RMM-RDD)f(a)da 
as 
ak 
- f c(ak-a)f(a)da 
can be written after some manipulation as 
(11) 
15 RL  ak 
B(V) =RL + RBB - R Ss -R MM - RDD - J  F(a)da -c J F(a)da.  (12) 
as  amin 
4  Maximization of bank value with fair pricing of 
subordinated debt and money market debt 
Consider first the benchmark case where all endogenous funding takes place at a fair 
rate  ie.  that  the  risk neutral  investors  require  an  expected return  RB  on both 
subordinated debt and money market debt. At that expected rate the supplies are fully 
elastic. Later we take a look at the situation when the price for money market debt 
deviates from the fair pricing. 
4.1  The optimization problem 
Given the assumption of risk neutrality, the objective of the bank (owner/manager) 
is to maximize bank value subject to the pricing constraints, balance sheet constraint, 
non-negativity contraints and the constraint S :s;  smax. The Lagrangean of  this problem 
is 
as 
Z = B(V) +  A1 (L + B - K - D - S - M) + AiR  Ss -R BS - J F(  a)da) 
aM 
+ A3(R  MM - R BM - J F(a)da) 
aD 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are 
ZL=MR(1-F(RL»  +  A1  + ilL =0,  MR ==  a(R(L)· L) 
aL 
ZB = R B(1-F(aS»  +cR  BF(ak) +  A1 
aM 
+ A2R B(F(a s) - F(aM » + A3R B(F(a M) - F(a  D)  + IlB =0 
16 
(13) ZM = -R  M(1-F(as» -c(1 +k)R MF(ak) -AI 
- A2R M(F(a S)  - F(aM » + AiR  M(1-F(aM » - R B) +  ~M  =0 
ZR
M = -M(1-F(aS» +c(1 +k)MF(ak)  - A2 M(F(aS) - F(aM » 
+A3M(1-F(aM »=0 
zTls =  Smax - S ;:: 0,  "S(smax - S) =  0 
A  Z l=L+B-K-D-S-M 
as 
ZAZ =R  Ss - R BS - J  F(a)da 
aM 
aM 
ZA, =R  MM - R BM - J  F(a)da. 
aD 
(14) 
Noting  that  A2  =  1  (=>  A3 = 1 + cCl +  k)FCa
k»  and  making  the  substitution 
1-FCaM ) 
Al = -MR(l - FCRL»  on the assumption that the portfolio always contains some 
amount  of loans,  we  can  restate  the  first -order  conditious  for  the  three  free 
endogenous variables 
17 Zs =MR(1 - F(RL)  - R B  + /ls -TJS =0 
ZM =MR(1 - F(RL)) - R M(1  - F(aM ) +c(1 +  k)F(ak») 
+ A 3(R  M(1  - F(aM )) - R B) +/lM =0 
Adding (15) and (17) yields 
[(RB_RM)(1-F(aM »)+cF(ak)(RB-(1 +k)RM) 




The term in the brackets in (18) can be shown to be negative for all c  :2:  0, implying 
that !lB + !lM > O. This means that if M> 0, then B =  0 and if B > 0 then M =  0.5 
In the optimum the bank never can have simultaneously bonds and money 
market debt in its portfolio. This reflects the fact that the model does not have any 
time dimension that would make holding liquid assets (like government bonds) 
valuable when their posted rate is less than the marginal costs of financing such 
acquisitions.6 
The solutions can thus be divided into two simple qualitatively different sets: 
one with positive money market debt, and the other one with no money market debt 
but potentially bonds in the portfolio. The first type of solution is likely to be more 
relevant for most "real world" banks in that it applies to a bank that actively funds 
itself in the market.7 The case with no money market funding applies to banks which 
face  such a weak demand for loans that the issue is how to  allocate the cheap 
deposits, exogenous in the model, between risky lending and safe bonds. 
5  In the perverse capital regulation  with  c < 0,  the  separation of the  solutions  obtains  only  for 
sufficiently small c's in absolute value. 
6 Here the model differs clearly from that of  Pass  more and Sharpe, in which "liquidity costs" motivate 
simultaneous holdings of loans and bonds even under risk neutrality. 
7 The assumption that banks issue money market debt certainly applies to "a representative Finnish 
deposit bank" since the mid-1980, when a true money market was established. For example at the end 
of 1990 the banks had certificates of deposits (the primary money market instrument) outstanding of 
the order of FIM 70 billion or some 25 per cent of the markka loans outstanding. Of the Finnish 
cooperative and savings banks only 11  percent had debts to other banks and "the market" less than 1  0 
percent of their lending at the same point of time. 
18 4.2  Solution with strong loan demand CM > 0, B = 0) 
Substituting MR(1 - F(RL»  in (17) from (16) yields 
(19) 
With c > 0, all other terms than TJs in (19) are negative so that TJs  must be positive 
implying S =  smax. Bank having money market debt must therefore have the balance 
sheet L = K + D + smax  + M.  This is  so because the investors require the same 
expected rate of return on both S and M, and for the bank the former is always more 
profitable because it helps meet the capital requirement and thereby avoid the non-
pecuniary costs associated with failing  to  do  so. If there is  no  effective capital 
regulation, c = 0,  no  specific  amount of subordinated debt is  implied,  as  then 
subordinated debt is equivalent to senior debt for both the investors and the bank. In 
the perverse case of c < 0, the optimal amount of subordinated debt is zero. 
The relevant first order condition for the determination of L and M is thus (17), 
which after substituting A3 obtains the form 
(20) 
or 
__  M_R-'-O_-_F-"(RL----..:.)..:....) _  = _R_B_ 
I-F(aM) 
(20') 
Given the assumption that MR is decreasing in L, it is easy to see by differentiation 
that the first order condition indeed defines a maximum, provided c ~ 0. If  c < 0, then 
its is required that the expected marginal revenue declines faster than the expected 
marginal cost of money market debt. 
(20) says that the expected marginal revenue from loans must equal the expected 
marginal cost of money  market debt including the  cost associated with capital 
requirement. No penalty for failing to meet the capital requirement, c =  0, would 
imply a straight equalization of the expected marginal revenue on loans with the 
required expected return on money market debt, which is the bond rate. The optimal 
loan volume does not depend in any way on bank characteristics. The bank balance 
sheet in inconsequential in sense of Modigliani  - Miller. As already noted, in this no 
penalty case, the bank would make no difference between subordinated debt and 
money market debt. 
However, with a positive c, the marginal cost for the bank exceeds the expected 
return to the holders of M by a factor which in fact is the shadow value of the pricing 
constraint on M, A 3• The denominator term in this factor, I - F(aM ), reflects the fact 
that every unit of M increases the posted rate of M (or the posted liability of the bank 
vis-a.-vis the holders of M). Therefore also the capital requirement is increased by 
more than what would happen if RM would not react to increased indebtedness. 
19 (20') says the same thing somewhat differently. It equals the marginal revenue 
on loans adjusted for capital requirement with the posted marginal cost of money 
market debt. In this form the adjusted marginal revenue on loans depends not only 
on the revenue net of credit losses from the loan contract but on the benefit of not 
needing to payout to the creditors in the case of default and the effect of increased 
borrowing on the expected penalty from not meeting the capital requirement. On the 
other hand, the investors in money market debt require a full compensation for the 
default risk but are unaffected by the capital regulation: the posted marginal cost of 
money market debt is thus RB/(l - F(aM)). 
Moreover, even in the absence of capital regulation (c=O),  the assumed fair 
pricing of money market debt eliminates the possibility of exploiting the money 
market investors: however large expected benefit to the owners from default, the 
default premium compensates it exactly. 
The optimum can be described graphically by drawing the  MR*  and MCM 
schedules based on equation 20 (Figure 1). 
















The reactions of M and L to changes in various exogenous factors can be obtained 
by differentiating (20) implicitely. The exogeneous factors examined are apart from 
the already introduced capital regulation parameters c and k, equity capital K, the cost 
of exogeneous deposits RD, the volume of exogeneous deposits D, also a demand 
shift variable x and a borrower quality variable z.  An increase in the demand shift 
variable x is assumed to have a positive impact on the willingness to pay ie.  the 
derivative of MR w.r.t x is assumed positive. An increase in the borrower quality 
variable z (eg. an increase of asset values) is assumed to shift the distribution function 
F(a) to the right. 
The deposit rate RD can be interpreted both literary as the cost of  deposit funding 
and as a general exogenous cost variable reflecting ego  operation costs. 
20 The comparative statics are shown not only for the "normal" case of positive 
penalties for capital insufficiency (c > 0), but also for the case of no such penalties 
(c=O)  and  the  perverse  case  of negative  penalties  for  capital  inadequacy.  The 
derivatives are reported in Appendix 1. Their signs are shown in Table 1. 
Table l. 
Penalty  End. 
param.  var. 
c>O  M 
L 
c=o  M 
L 
c<O  M 
L 
Comparative statics when M > 0 
































z = improvement of borrower quality: aF(a,z)/az s 0, af(a,z)/az < 0 for small a and af(a,z)/az > 0 for 
large a. 
+(  - ): both possible but + more likely 
The effect of the bond rate RB is unambiguously negative on lending (and money 
market funding),  as  the  bond rate  is  the  opportunity cost  for  the  investors  in 
subordinated debt and money market debt. A rise in this cost increases the expected 
marginal cost of funds and thus the required expected marginal revenue on loans. 
The effects of capital regulation depend critically on whether there indeed is a 
positive penalty for non-performance. If  there is, then both the size of the penalty and 
the requirement as such affect negatively lending. With no penalty, the requirement 
obviously has no bearing on lending, and with a negative penalty higher requirement 
leads to more lending as a failure to meet the requirement gets rewarded. 
Similarily, the effects of equity capital and the deposit rate (other exogeneous 
costs) depend on the stiffness of  capital regulation. More equity capital implies with 
unchanged lending less money market debt. As long as the penalty for a failure to 
meet the  capital requirement is  positive,  the smaller amount of M  reduces  the 
expected penalty and thus the expected marginal cost for the bank as  well.  This 
facilitates increasing lending, which is subject to decreasing returns. In the absence 
of capital regulation the marginal cost of money market debt is the constant bond rate 
RB required by the investors. In this case lending does not respond to equity capital 
at all but all changes are compensated by an equal negative change in money market 
debt.  By  the  same token,  the exogenous  cost element  RD  affects  the  marginal 
21 condition for lending only to the extent it changes the expected cost for not meeting 
the capital requirement. 
The effect of exogeneous deposits resembles very much that of equity capital. 
It lowers the use of money market debt in every case. The marginal condition is only 
affected  to  the  extent  the  expected  capital  insufficiency  penalty  is  affected. 
Quantitatively the positive effect of deposits on lending, in the case of a positive c, 
is nevertheless weaker than that of bank capital as  deposit funding is  subject to 
capital requirement itself. 
Change in loan demand in the sense of customers' willingness to pay for any 
given loan stock has in principle an ambiguous effect on loan volume. The reason is 
simple. Although the marginal revenue increases in the case of no borrower default, 
a higher liability of the borrower also implies ceteris paribus a higher likelihood of 
default. However, when the density of the project return is small at the level of the 
contract commitment RL ie. the change in the default probability small, then a higher 
contract rate also implies a higher expected marginal revenue and a higher loan stock. 
But also  the  distribution of the  return on  the project for  which  finance  is 
demanded or the value of the collateral assets may change.  The effects of such 
changes depend crucially on how the distribution function F(a) changes; they are 
difficult to condense in anyone impact. Changes which affect the distribution of a 
only for a > RL are inconsequential. Changes that mainly shift probability mass from 
the range ak < a < RL to the range a > RL increase the expected marginal return on 
loans and thus the loan stock. A shift of probability mass from the range a < ak and 
within this range have effects on the expected costs of capital regulation penalty. 
Thus an increase in the borrower quality in the sense that the distribution function 
shifts to the right, increases lending also in this range, unless perverse regulation 
makes low return realizations highly attractive. 
In sum,  assuming a positive penalty for  capital insufficiency, the predicted 
behaviour corresponds quite well with standard views  about bank behaviour. In 
contrast assuming no penalty implies that the bank's loan extention is essentially 
independent of bank characteristics; it is determined by the market interest rate and 
demand conditions, including the borrower qUality. Finally, if banks which fail to 
meet  the  capital  requirement  are  rewarded  through  ill-conceived  bank  support 
policies, perverse effects result. 
4.3  Solution with weaker loan demand: M=O 
When the  demand for loans is  not high enough to  make the expected marginal 
revenue on loans MR  * equal the expected marginal cost of money market debt MCM , 
the relevant marginal conditions are (15) and (16). Note that in (15) the second term 
disappears, as  aM = aD when M = 0, resulting thus in the marginal conditions: 
22 (21) 
(16) 
The outcome depends thus on the relative sizes of  MR  *, and the expected marginal 
revenue on bonds MRB  ==  RB(1  - F(aD ) + cF(ak» and the posted bond rate RB, which 
is the expected marginal cost of subordinated debt for the bank. 
MRB  can in general be greater than, equal to or smaller than RB.  This is so, 
because one must deduct from the posted rate RB the part that in expectation is paid 
out to the depositors in the case of bank default and add the benefit from a smaller 
expected penalty from not meeting the capital requirement when the amount RB of 
sure value is created. 
MRB is increasing in B with small B as long as the density function is not too 
exotic and c not close to unity: increasing bonds increases the expected marginal 
return, as additional bond revenues decrease the probability of defaulting by R  Bf( aD) 
but increase the expected penalty only by the fraction c times RBf(ak). 
AtB = 0, MRB < RB if  c < c*  ==  F(aD)/F(ak» < 1. At high enough B, say B*, MRB 
reaches RB. At a still higher B**  ==  (ROU - amin)/RB  < D, the deposits become fully safe 
(F(aD ) =  0),  and only the declining capital requirement effect remains:  MRB  is 
decreasing in B in this range. That ceases at B = B***  ==  «(1 + k)RDD - amin)/RB , when 
the bank is sure to meet the capital requirement. For B > B***, MRB = RB. 
With c > c  * MR  B starts right away above the bond rate, and in the special case 
of c = 1 and the distribution uniform MRB is flat in the range [O,B*]. This represents 
thus a very stiff enforcement of the capital adequacy regulation with such a penalty 
imposed in the case of  inadequate capital that the bank owner/manager would in fact 
be fully liable. This is of course unlikely to be a feature of any real world capital 
regulation (Figure 2). 
Figure 2.  Expected marginal return on bonds 
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23 The kinky shape of  the expected marginal return on bonds MRB and the a priori rather 
unrestricted shape and position of  the expected marginal return on loans schedule MR 
imply that many types optima can exist, even if the portfolio is always assumed to 
contain loans. Thus there may be either S or B in the portfolio, depending on the 
precise shapes and positions of  MR  * and MRB. As the banks with no money market 
funding do not appear to be representative, we do not pursue the analysis of such 
banks further here. Various cases are illustrated in Appendix 2. It is nevertheless 
important to notice that the comparative statics can differ radically depending on the 
precise nature of the optimum. 
When the portfolio is a corner solution L =  K + D or L =  K + D + Smax., loans are 
determined 1 to  1 by the exogenous funding K + D (and the maximum allowed 
amount of subordinate debt), and no other factors influence the optimum on the 
margin. 
But the portfolio may also be defmed by the marginal conditions MR* = MRB or 
MR* = RB. When the portfolio is defined by the marginal condition is MR* = MRB, 
yet two alternatives are possible: MR* can intersect MRB either in the downward 
sloping (in L) section, when the bank is risky F(aD)  > 0, or in the upward sloping 
section when the bank is safe (F(aD) = 0). If  intersection of  the two schedules happens 
to take place in the upward sloping range, the relevant bond return function collapses 
into MRB = RB(1 + cF(ak)). If  the intersection takes place in the downward sloping 
range of MRB the also the F(a~ term is included. When the marginal condition is 
MR* = RB, yet different comparative statics are implied. The characteristics of the 
comparative statistics in the three types of interior solutions are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.  Comparative statics of L in interior solutions with c > 0 
Exogenous variables 
L determined by:  RB  c  k  K  RD  D  x  z 
(a) MR'  = RB(l-F(aD)+cF(ak))  +  +(-)  +(-) 
(b) MR'  = RB(l+cF(ak))  +  +  +(-)  + 
(c) MR'= RB  0  0  0  0  0  +(-)  + 
+(  - ): both possible but + more likely 
The fundamental reason for the very varied outcomes is the capital requirement. 
Should k =  0, the MRB schedule would never exceed RB, and only corner solutions 
or the solution with MR* =  RB would be possible. 
Although banks typically do borrow in the money market, so that the type of 
behaviour predicted by this subsection is not likely to be common, some banks may 
indeed find themselves in this demand postion According to the model, the behaviour 
of such banks is rather erratic. This has an important implication for empirical work. 
To the extent there are in the sample banks, the behaviour of which is determined as 
in this section, estimating loan supply may be highly difficult as one probably cannot 
a priori classify the banks within this group in different regimes. It may even be 
difficult to distinguish between banks that rely (essentially) on money market debt 
from the banks which face too weak demand for loans to borrow in the money market 
24 at all. The banks of weak demand for loans are likely to appear outliers in loan 
equations estimated for samples containing different types of banks. 
5  Pricing of money market debt fixed 
Here we relax the assumption that endogenous senior debt of the bank is fairly priced 
while keeping the assumption of fairly priced subordinated debt.  Two types  of 
differences  in  (the  markets  for)  the  respective  claims  could  rationalize  this 
discrepancy of pricing. 
First, subordinated debt typically never is subject to any sort of formal creditor 
protection. In contrast, some senior bank liabilities, which are priced very close to 
proper money market debt, are covered by the deposit insurance schemes. In the 
Finnish context, taxable time deposits are such instruments. In addition in the case 
of  bank bailouts, holders of  senior debt are typically fully covered for losses while the 
holders of subordinated debt may incur some losses or at least be forced to inject 
further  capital  in  the  bank;  implicit  creditor  protection  applies  with  a  higher 
probability to senior debt than to subordinated debt. Therefore, as  a whole, the 
holders of senior debt potentially have less reason to worry about the default risk of 
their claims on banks than the holders of subordinated debt. 
Second, buyers of such risky instruments as  subordinated debt (presumably 
mainly professional investors) probably are better informed about the risks and 
behaviour of  the issuers than the typical buyers of senior debt. Therefore the former 
may be in a better position to price the default risk than the latter. The latter - to the 
extent they see reason to consider credit risk - may resort to the use of quantitative 
restrictions (quotas). This may result in a highly convex marginal cost curve for 
senior debt. 
Allowing underpricing of money market debt M in the analysis means simply 
dropping the fair pricing constraint and postulating a fixed marginal cost function 
instead. Let us denote this posted function by MC. In general this may be a constant 
or a fixed increasing function of M. With this change the first order conditions 




Again, on the basis of the reasonable assumption that MC 2  RB,  there cannot be 
bonds and money market debt on the balance sheet simultaneously, as can be seen by 
adding (22) and (24). Obviously, the case when no M is issued is the same that was 
already discussed in the former section. The case with positive M is,  however, 
different. As the posted price of M is fixed (exogenous) rather than set so as to make 
25 the expected return equal RB, the expected marginal cost of money market debt takes 
the form 
(25) 
This quantity MCMf need not always be at least RB,  as MCM  in (20), but may be 
smaller. Only with a very strict capital regulation (c(l + k)  ~ 1 is sufficient) MCMf is 
always above RB and increasing. In that case, S is necessarily always at the maximum 
smax and the the second order condition is fulfilled so that there is a finite M at which 
the expected marginal cost MCMf is just equal the expected marginal revenue on loans 
MR'. This result obtains even with a constant MC ie.  the posted rate need not 





MR  *  and the expected marginal cost of Money Market 
debt with fixed pricing, M > 0 
a) Stiff capital regulation 
M 
MC 
*  MR 
~----------------+------------------- L 
max 
o  K+O+S  L 
b) Normal capital regulation and MC relatively flat 
L 
o  K+D However, with a more lenient, "normal" capital regulation, MCMf is  decreasing, 
unless MC is rising steeply enough. At an extreme, an infinite portfolio could result: 
The expected marginal cost declines with increasing probability of default while the 
expected return  on lending  does  not  decline  as  fast.  As  the  expected cost  of 
subordinated debt is RB, no such debt would be issued but all funding would take the 
form of underpriced senior debt. This possibility, shown in panel Cb)  of Figure 3, 
illustrates at the purest the moral hazard problem associated with underpriced funding 
whether it stems from explicit deposit insurance or implicit creditor protection. 
A more reasonable assumption is that MC is more or less constant with low 
values of  M while it increases steeply with high enough M. For instance, simple rules 
of thumb could result in setting quotas on the amount of any investor's purchases of 
the money market debt of any individual bank. Once the quotas start to bind, the 
marginal costs of additional funds increase steeply. 
Such a posted marginal cost schedule MC would imply a U-shaped expected 
marginal cost schedule MCMf, which mayor may not be above RB for all values ofM. 
With sufficient convexity of  MC the MCMf schedule intersects at some point MR*.8 
That of course guarantees the existence of a finite solution. Depending on whether 
this point of intersection is above or below RB , the bank issues the maximum allowed 
amount of subordinated debt or no such debt at al1.9 
An important consequence of this U-shaped expected marginal cost schedule is 
that the intersection of the expected marginal cost and expected marginal revenue 
curves can take place both in the downward sloping section and the upward sloping 
sections of MCMf. The latter occurs when demand for loans is high enough, as MR~ 
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8  Second order condition requires that only the MR' schedules which intersect MeMf from above 
produce an optimum. 
9 One may argue on the basis of arbitrage that the expected marginal revenue on loans cannot decline 
much below the safe rate RB, at least not for any individual bank of small size. Borrowers may namely 
invest the borrowed funds in bonds, which they pledge as collateral for borrowing and thus make 
lending safe for the bank. 
27 The comparative statics hinges essentially on the point of intersection of the expected 
marginal return on loans schedule and the expected marginal cost schedule of money 
market debt. The qualitative results are shown in Table 3; the derivatives can be 
found in Appendix 1. The most interesting case is the positive penalty situation, as 
in this case the results differ in essential way from those obtained assuming fair 
pricing of money market debt. 
Table 3.  Comparative statics with a fixed marginal cost schedule 
MC 
Exogenous variables 
RB  m  c  k  K  RD  D  x  z 
c>O  M  0  +(-)  +/- +(-)  +(-) 
L  0  +/- +(-)  +/- +(-)  +(-) 
c=O  M  0  0  +  +/- +(-)  +(-) 
L  0  0  +/- +  +/- +(-)  +(-) 
c<O  M  0  -(  +)  +  +  +/- +(-)  +(-) 
L  0  -(+)  +  +/- +  +/- +(-)  +(-) 
m denotes here an increase in the posted marginal cost of M at any level of M 
+/-: both possible depending on circumstances 
+(  -): both possible but + more likely 
The role of the bond rate as the marginal cost of money market funding is replaced 
here by the shape of  the cost schedule. An upward shift in the posted schedule implies 
less such funding and lending. The penalty parameters work just as with fair pricing. 
The roles  of bank capital,  deposit costs  and deposit volume,  however,  change 
radically. 
An increase in equity capital shifts the MCMf  schedule to the right. Thus a 
positive shock to equity capital increases lending if MR*  intersects MCMf  in the 
upward sloping section (MR~  in Figure 4). However, if the intersection happens to 
be in the downward sloping range of MCMf, the opposite is true. The economic 
explanation of the perverse effect is that the expected marginal benefit to the bank 
from defaulting on M declines more than the posted marginal cost plus the expected 
marginal cost of failing the capital regulation decline in response to increased capital. 
This makes the bank to reduce money market borrowing at a given level of lending 
by more than just to compensate for the additional funding in the form of equity 
capital (MR; in Figure 4). 
The effect ofRD is also ambiguous in principle. Higher deposit costs increase the 
likelihood of defaulting on the money market debt and thereby decrease the expected 
cost of such liabilities. Expansion of lending follows. The capital requirement on D 
nevertheless counteracts this moral hazard incentive, but unless the penalty parameter 
c is very high (close to 1), the effect on default probability dominates. 
Similarily, the effects of the deposit volume are ambiguous. Higher deposits 
lower the posted marginal cost of M but lower the expected marginal benefit from 
defaulting on M (which is higher than that on D, as RM > RD ). As long as c > 0, the 
capital requirement works to keep incentives correct. The outcome depends, as with 
28 equity capital,  crucially on  the  shape  of the  MCMf schedule.  It being rising  is 
sufficient for a positive lending response to D. However, rising MCMf schedule is not 
necessary for a positive lending response, but such a response may obtain also with 
slightly decreasing MCMf schedule. Thus an increase in deposits can have a positive 
effect on lending while an increase in capital has simultaneously a negative effect. 
The effects of loan demand are the same as  with fair pricing. However, the 
effects of borrower quality become in principle ambiguous, as an improvement of 
borrower quality  makes  defaulting  on M  less  likely  and thereby  increases  the 
expected marginal cost of funding. 
In sum, if  the pricing of the marginal funding for the bank does not sufficiently 
reflect the riskiness of bank portfolio, moral hazard incentives may make the bank 
response perversely to changes in bank capital, costs, deposits and even borrower 
quality, even if failure to meet capital requirements is effectively penalized. Thus 
moral hazard leading to excessive risky lending may result both from underprincing 
of  banks marginal funding and ill-conceived capital regulation (bank support policies 
which reward capital insufficiency). 
6  Capital requirement levied on the asset side 
Replacing the capital requirement levied on bank liabilities by a requirement that is 
levied on the risky assets does not alter much in the formal analysis. What is changed 
is basically the equation for the treshhold project return below which the bank owners 
start to incur non-pecuniary costs at the rate c: 
(26) 
The threshhold continues to depend on the commitments vis-a-vis depositors and 
holders of money market debt and investments in the safe asset as all these influence 
bank net worth. The new element is that loans (the risky assets) instead of liabilities 
determine the level of required regulatory capital. 
6.1  Fair pricing of money market debt 
Assuming the pricing of  both subordinated debt and money market debt fair leads to 
the following first order conditions which correspond to the earlier conditions (15) 
through (17): 
R B(I-F(aM) +cF(ak)) +  A3R B(F(aM)  - F(aD)) +  I-1B 
-MR(l-F(RL) -ckF(ak)) =0 
MR(1-F(RL) -ckF(ak)) - R B  +  I-1s - TJs =0 
(27) 
(28) 
29 MR(l-F(RL) -ckF(ak)) - R M(l-F(aM) +cF(ak)) 
+ A3(R  M(l-F(aM )) - R B) + IlM =0 
(29) 
The difference between these and the earlier first order conditions is that the marginal 
expected revenue on loans is affected by the capital requirement and the marginal 
expected cost of money market debt does not anymore incorporate the effect of 
additional required capital. 
Again, the portfolio cannot contain simultaneously money market debt and 
bonds. Here we consider only the more relevant case of positive money market debt. 
The portfolio is defined in this case by 
(30) 
or 
The outcome is thus very similar to what was obtained with the liability side capital 
regulation.  (30)  says that the expected marginal revenue on loans including the 
expected cost of failing to meet the capital requirement equals the expected marginal 
cost of funds.  The marginal cost of money market debt is affected by the capital 
requirement penalty, as the amount money market debt affects the bank's contractual 
commitment and thereby the treshold project return that makes the bank just meet the 
capital requirement. 
In (30') the last term is positive, as (28) implies that MR > RB/(l - F(RL) 
- ckF(ak)) > RB/(l - F(aM )). It shows that the asset side capital requirement leads to 
a higher marginal revenue requirement on loans and thus a lower loan volume than 
the liability side requirement with the same parameter values k and c. This is due to 
the fact  that with the  asset  side  regulation  all  loans  are  subject to  the  capital 
requirement while in the liability side regulation only the loans that are financed by 
D and M carry a capital requirement. 
This difference implies that a shift from a capital regulation levied on the 
liability side to an asset side regulation without changing the required level of capital 
(parameter k) or the stiffness of enforcement (parameter c) leads to a smaller amount 
of risky lending. 
The effects of changes in exogenous factors do not change much with the type 
of capital regulation. The comparative statics in the case with positive M remain 
qualitatively  the  same  with the  asset  side  regulation  as  with the  liability  side 
regulation. The derivatives are reported in the Appendix 1. 
30 6.2  Pricing of money market debt fixed 
Just as with the liability side regulation, the pricing principle of money market debt 
does not change the basic nature of the optimum. Again, banks which find it optimal 
to issue money market debt hold loans as the only asset. In this case the marginal 
condition defining the loan supply takes the form 
(31) 
where MC is the fixed marginal cost schedule of M. The comparative statics turn 
somewhat more messy but remain qualitatively the same as in the fixed pricing case 
of the liability side capital regulation, see Appendix 1. 
7  Discussion 
7.1  Summary and some general points 
The analysis of  bank portfolio choice in our simple static framework with symmetric 
information and risk neutral agents illustrates some basic issues of the importance of 
bank capital, capital requirement and the pricing principles of  bank funding for risky 
bank lending. In addition, the model also incorporates influences from the "demand 
side": borrowers' willingness to pay and borrower quality. 
The bank considered has the priviledge of being allowed to supply what could 
be called core deposits at a low fixed rate of interest. This priviledge creates "charter 
value" for the bank, which depends on the regulated rate, other exogenous costs of 
operation and on the scale at which these deposits are demanded. Exogenous equity 
capital and the exogenous deposits can be augmented by money market debt (a 
generic term for all other senior funding than core deposits). Money market debt is 
subject  to  either  fair  pricing  or  a  fixed  pricing  schedule,  which  may  imply 
underpricing or overpricing relative to the required expected return equal to the safe 
rate of interest. The bank can also issue subordinated debt, which is  always fairly 
priced and counts as regulatory capital up to a maximum. The funds can be placed in 
risky loans subject to a declining demand curve or government bonds yielding the 
safe rate. 
In the model bank behaviour depends crucially on whether or not demand for 
bank loans is high enough to make the use of money market debt profitable. In the 
case of no such debt, the behaviour varies a a great deal depending on not only the 
level of loan demand but also the nature of the capital requirement.  However, 
thinking of many banking markets, certainly the Finnish one, this sort of bank is not 
typical. More relevant is the case, where the bank uses other (senior) funding than 
core deposits on the margin. In this case, the key issue is the pricing principle of this 
debt. 
If  money market debt is priced fairly, the default premium applied to funding 
exactly compensates for the default risk: no exploitation of  the investors by the bank 
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commitment vis-a.-vis depositors and holders of money market debt, plus possibly a 
fraction of this commitment as  a  safety margin constituting jointly "the capital 
requirement", the bank's loan supply is determined. simply by the requirement.that 
the expected marginal return on loans equals the safe rate of interest. In this case, 
banking is inconsequential in the sense that bank characteristics do not in any way 
affect lending. It  is determined solely by the demand for credit, including borrower 
quality, in the bank's local market and the safe rate of interest. In particular, the 
amount of equity capital the owners have invested in the bank in the past and the 
amount of subsidy incorporated in the underpriced deposits do not affect lending in 
any way, although they naturally affect the rate of return on the exogenous equity. 
However, if there is  a positive penalty for  failing  the capital requirement, 
whether imposed by the authorities or "the market", lending depends greatly on bank 
characteristics. In particular, the higher capital and core deposits, the more lending, 
and the higher the charter value (the lower the rate on core deposits), the more 
lending. The reason is simple: the more there is equity capital or cheap deposits and 
the cheaper these cheap deposits are, the less likely it is, ceteris paribus, that the bank 
faces a penalty for capital insufficiency. This specification of the model thus predicts 
several types of "credit crunches" ie. leftward shifts in bank credit supply: First, a 
credit crunch due to disintermediation results when the amount of cheap deposits 
decline say due to additional competition from outside banking. Second, a reduction 
of  the charter value of  banking due to smaller subsidy in the form of  underpriced core 
deposits (higher deposit rate) leads to a decline of  lending. Analoguous effects relate 
to other exogenous costs of banking, caused for example by changes in wage costs 
or information technology. Third, a loss of  equity, say, due to credit losses incurred, 
reduces lending. Fourth, a tightening of capital regulation whether in the form of a 
higher requirement or in the form of stricter enforcement leads to less lending. 
The behaviour of the bank may be very different if the pricing of marginal 
funding is not fair but follows  a fixed (non-decreasing) posted schedule. If the 
marginal cost of funding rises fast enough (and the penalty for capital insufficiency 
is positive), the behaviour is qualitatively the same as above in the fair pricing case. 
In fact, bank lending may decline more say in response to a decline in equity in this 
case  than  with  fair  pricing.  A  steeply  increasing  marginal  cost  curve  can  be 
interpreted as standing in for the unmodelled situation of asymmetric information 
leading to a lemons premium, which lies behind much of the recent theoretical 
thinking of financial intermediation. 
But if the posted rate on money market debt rises too slowly, the bank can shift 
a part of the credit risk  of  its lending to the holders of money market debt (or if these 
are guaranteed by the authorities to the authorities). Bank behaviour is characterized 
by moral hazard: it is profitable for the bank to increase risky lending beyond the 
point where it would be with fair pricing, as the investors in bank liabilities can be 
made to share in the credit risk. Furthermore, in this case decline in equity capital, an 
increase in the exogenous (deposit) costs and even a decline in the volume of core 
deposits (the requirement for this is somewhat more stringend) can lead to increased 
risky lending. 
The penalty for insufficient capital reduces bank incentives of moral hazard. 
However, the penalty would need to be close to an equivalent of unlimited liability 
to eliminate such incentives altogether. It is unlikely that any real world capital 
regulation carries such penalties nor that "the markets" impose such penalties on the 
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applied in the case of failure work in the same direction. However, the size of the 
safety margin ie. required capital on top of the contractual commitments vis-a-vis the 
depositors and holders of money market debt is not important nor is the exact form 
of the requirement. Even under no such margin a positive penalty levied in the case 
of  capital insufficiency discourages risky lending. Similarily, a requirement calculated 
on the basis of risky assets works essentially in the same way as a requirement 
calculated on the basis of (senior) liabilities, although a shift from the latter to the 
former tightens the regulation if  the parameters are kept the same. In contrast, a zero 
penalty is equivalent to no capital regulation at all. 
One may even contemplate a negative penalty. Such a perverse situation could 
emerge if the authorities gave transfers to the bank that does not meet the capital 
requirement.  In practice  many  types  of transfers  can  be  though  of,  including 
subsidized loans, asset purchases at inflated prices and even capital injections. If  the 
bank expects such behaviour on the part of the authorities, perverse incentives exist 
even with a fair pricing of bank liabilities. The model thus suggests of two kinds of 
moral hazard, one stemming from underpriced marginal funding, the other from 
misguided bank support policies. Both lead to excessive risky lending (relative to fair 
pricing, non-rewarding bank support policies). 
The basic results of the model are in no way new. Neither is the theoretical set-
up particularly original. The model is a modification of a standard model of banking 
firm, used ego by Dermine (1984, 1986). 
The potential for a credit crunch due to disintermediation has been recognized 
long, see ego Wojnilower (1980). Lack of bank capital or net worth as cause of credit 
crunch has  been extensively discussed in the  United  States  in  the  early  1990, 
following the early contribution by Bemanke and Lown (1991). Theorically the 
possibility of a credit crunch has received a lot of  attention in the models that develop 
under  the  assumption  of  asymmetric  information  a  rationale  for  financial 
intermediation from the first principles, see ego  Bemanke and Gertler (1987), or 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1995). In this paper,just as for example in Kashyap and Stein 
(1994), a fixed steeply rising marginal cost schedule stands in for the more elaborate 
adverse selection or moral hazard arguments of the models explicitely taking into 
account asymmetric information. A paper relatively close to the credit crunch aspects 
of this  analysis  is  Passmoore and Sharpe  (1994),  which also  develops testable 
implications of the credit crunch hypothesis. 
Similarily, the possibility that mispriced funding can lead to excessive risk 
taking has been a central element of much of the literature on the pricing of deposit 
insurance. Among the important contributions are apart from Merton (1977), also 
Kareken and Wallace (1978) and Pennachi (1987). Also in the analysis of Dermine 
the implications of mispriced deposit insurance are taken up. Also the effects of  bank 
support policies on the incentives of risk taking in banking have received substantial 
attention in the discussion and analyses of bank support policies, see for example 
Calomiris (1995). 
What this paper does is to  show how both excessive risky lending due to 
underpriced funding or misguided bank support policies and excessive contraction 
of  credit due to shortage of inherited equity capital or cheap deposits and due to high 
costs can emerge in a single framework. 
The model is set up so as to resemble the situation of the Finnish cooperative 
and savings banks since the rnid-1980s. An important feature of the model in this 
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which the bank can use up to a maximum to meet the capital requirement. Here the 
model deviates clearly from that of Dermine, which assumes that equity capital is 
available in unlimited amounts at the expected rate equal to the bond rate. The model 
predicts that a bank which issues money market debt uses the maximum allowed 
amount of subordinated debt if there is a positive penalty for capital insufficiency and 
the pricing of marginal funding is fair. Therefore, the amount of subordinated debt 
can be used separately from the differing comparative static results of  lending to infer 
about the stringency of capital regulation and the pricing of bank funding. 
Another deviation from the formulation of  Dermine is to make a clear distinction 
between priviledged deposit funding that creates "charter value" for the bank from 
other funding that is available at "market" rates of interest. The used formulation 
makes very explicit the relationship between bank charter value and lending. In 
particular, with underpriced marginal funding,  lowering of the charter value, for 
whaterver reason, leads to an increase in risky lending. 
Finally, unlike Dermine's model, the model of this paper analyzes the behaviour 
of banks under two different forms of capital regulation. It shows in particular that 
the basic results are not sensitive to whether capital regulation is of the type applied 
in Finland in the 1980s or of the type in place in the 1990s. 
7.2  The Finnish credit cycle in the light of the theory 
A central feature of the period of rapid credit expansion 1986 through 1990 was that 
savings banks expanded lending substantially more than other banks and among the 
savings banks (as also among the cooperative banks) the rates of growth varied a 
great deal. Furthermore, a clear positive relationship appears between the rate of 
growth of lending in the boom years and the subsequent asset quality, see Solttila and 
VihriaIli (1994). Similarily in the contraction phase, some banks contracted lending 
much more than others, and this time the savings banks typically reduced lending 
more than other banks. The question thus arises, what made certain banks to expand 
risky lending so rapidly in the late  1990s and certain banks contract lending so 
strongly in the early 1990s. 
The model provides several types of explanations for the bank-wise variation in 
lending growth. 
First, the differences may be essentially due to demand side factors (including 
borrower quality). A given bank expanded lending more than banks one average 
because there was in the local credit market (1) higher demand for loans (relative to 
the cheap core deposits) at any given loan rate or (2) a more favourable (less risky) 
return distribution of the projects to be financed or higher collateral values (better 
borrower quality). The analysis also rationalizes why in both cases strong expansion 
of  credit was risky in the sense that more credit implied higher percentage of credit 
losses. As long as the distribution of the return for the project for which finance is 
seeked remains given in the model, more lending implies higher credit losses relative 
to the outstanding loan commitment by the borrower. 
As real estate businesses and many other non-manufacturing activities have 
traditionally been very important in the lending of the savings banks, one may argue 
that strong demand in these sectors boosted lending especially by the savings banks. 
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losses were the highest. And by the same token it can be argued that during the crisis 
years demand was weakest in this sector leading to a weaker than average growth of 
lending by the savings banks in the early 1990s. The findings by Solttila and Vihrihlli 
nevertheless suggest that this type "bad luck" in terms of business specialization, 
although it played a role, is not the only explanation for the period of rapid growth; 
even if the sectoral differences are accounted for, banks that expanded faster in the 
1980s also ended up with a higher shares of problem assets in the early 1990s. 
The model also accomodates explanations based on subjective expectations 
about the project returns (borrower quality) deviating from the true ones, if one 
interpretes the distribution function F(.) as a perceived rather than true distribution 
of the return of the risky activity to be financed. As noted in the introduction, Minsky 
and Kindleberger among others have argued that such concepts as optimism, euphoria 
and pessimism govern changes in the expectations of bankers as well as those of the 
ultimate investors.  Thus if one  assumes  that  some bankers  became highly and 
unrealistically optimistic about the lending opportunities, and that this happened 
particularly in the savings banks sector in the late 1980s, the model would naturally 
predict high growth of lending for such banks. However, this sort of hypotheses are 
very difficult if not impossible to test, as one cannot measure, at least not ex post, the 
perceptions of the bankers in question. 
Another and somewhat more structured version of the explanation based on the 
difference between perceived and true probability distributions of the project returns 
is provided by Guttentag and Herring (1984). They argue that in periods of no major 
shocks in the economy, the perceived risks tend to diminish relative to the true ones. 
The closer an experience of a major negative shock is, in the time dimension or 
otherwise, the more risky the investment opportunies are perceived. In the case of 
Finnish banking in the mid-1980s, it might be argued that a virtual absence of credit 
losses for decades in the tightly regulated financial system had led bankers and their 
borrowers alike to believe that credit risks would be largely absent also in the future. 
Financial liberalization, which eliminated the possibility of shifting the burden of 
financial distress from borrowers to depositors through negative real rates of interest, 
however, changed the situation fundamentally but in a way which probably was not 
fully understood by the bankers.1O  One might even argue, that as  the cooperative 
banks had rather recently experienced significant solvency difficulties, they were less 
likely to assume away credit risks.ll Nevertheless, it seems very difficult to subject 
even this version of the "wrong expectations" explanation for rigorous testing. The 
same applies to the credit crunch explanations that are based on the argument that the 
bankers became very conservative in their risk assessments during the economic 
crisis starting in 1991. 
But the model's main thrust concerns explanations which relate to the objective 
conditions of individual banks: (1) differences in the opportunities faces by the bank 
in terms of  the pricing of marginal funding and the strictness of capital regulation and 
10  Pettersson (1993) argues strongly that in Sweden, whose banking crisis resembles very much the 
Finnish one, bankers typically paid very little if any attention at all to credit risk in the late 1980s. 
I1  The central bank of cooperative banks, Okobank had been on the brink of collapse in the early 1970s 
threathening the solvency of many of its owners (cooperative banks). In the 1980s, a relatively large 
cooperative bank, Iisalmen Osuuspankki, had  also experienced serious solvency problems which 
caused costs to the mutual deposit insurance fund. 
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deposits and the charter value implied by the underpricing of these deposits relative 
to the going market rate. 
The theory suggests in particular that the banks which expanded faster in the 
1980s, faced an underpriced marginal cost schedule of funding, and/or more lenient 
if not preverse capital regulation and perhaps also were initially weaker in terms of 
capital and costs. 
The marginal sources of funds for individual banks were the market for bank 
certificates of deposits, borrowing from other banks, which in the case of the savings 
banks and cooperative banks means their "central banks", Skopbank and Okobank, 
respectively,  and  mainly in the  case  of commercial banks,  foreign  banks.  The 
argument suggest thus examining the characteristics of these markets, especially to 
what extent pricing there reflected bank risk and whether there were differences in 
this regard, say between the savings banks and the cooperative banks. 
A true money market started to develop in Finland from the beginning of 1987. 
Banks' certificates of deposit (CD's) became the main instrument in this market. 
There was basically no price differentiation between the CD's issued by different 
major banks. Thus, to the extent banks indeed were associated with different credit 
risks these differences did not show up in the pricing of the main money market 
instrument. This is, if nothing else,  at least consistent with the idea that banks' 
marginal funding was not fairly priced. 
The model suggests also examining capital regulation.  As  noted earlier the 
regulations in force in the 1980s were more lenient for the cooperative banks and the 
savings banks than for the commercial banks. But for the savings bank group and the 
cooperative bank group the requirements were the same. Thus to the extent regulation 
can explain differences in risky lending among the cooperative and savings banks, 
the reason can only be enforcement. Not very much can be said about potential 
differences in this regard. Some scope for differences may in any case have existed, 
as for the most part supervision was carried out by two different bodies under the 
.  . 
mam supervIsory agency. 
But to really explain the differences in behaviour across individual cooperative 
banks and savings banks on the basis of  the moral hazard or credit crunch hypotheses, 
one needs to examine the relationships on the one hand bank lending and on the other 
hand bank equity capital, bank costs and core deposits. 
A negative effect of  bank capital (and potentially even that of core deposits) and 
a  positive  effect  of bank  costs  would  be  compatible  with  the  moral  hazard 
explanation but in conflict with the argument that credit growth was  determined 
purely by demand conditions (including borrower quality). 
Analogous issues need to be examined for the contraction phase. Thus: are there 
reason  to  believe  that  pricing  of the  banks'  marginal  liabilities  and/or  capital 
regulation turned highly stiff at least for some subset of banks, and can one observe 
a  positive relationship  between bank capital  (core  deposits)  and  lending and  a 
negative relationship between bank costs and bank lending? Affirmative answers to 
these questions would suggest that some type of credit crunch is at least partitially 
responsible for the observed credit contraction. 
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38 Appendix 1 
The second order conditions and the comparative statics 
A. Liability side capital requirement, fair pricing, M > 0 
First order condition (FOC): 
Second order condition (SaC): 
aH =MR*' -MCM ', 
aM 
where 
MC*' = aMR*  =MR' -(1-F(RL)) -MR2 -f(RL) <0, 
aM 
when MR is decreasing ie MR' < O. 
aH  :::}-<O 
aM 
always with MR' < 0 and c ~  O. 
Comparative statics: 
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B. Liability side capital regulation, fixed pricing, M > 0 
FOe:  H=MR  * - MCMf =0, 
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SOC:  dH  =  MR  *' _  MCMf' 
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when MC' large enough or f(RL) not too much smaller than f(aM). 
Comparative statics 
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unless f(aM)  very large 
aH =MR**' -MCocokoMRof(ak)<O =>  dM<O 
aK  dK 
dL 
-----~----------------~ = 
dK  MR**' -MCocokoMRf(ak)-MCML' 
> unless c very large 
unless c very large 
>0, when MCMf'>O 
=0,  when MCMf' =0 
<0, when MCMf' <0 
- MR °c ok oR D  °f(a k) + MC(R  Df(a M) -c o(kMR + R D)f(a k)) 







dL = -MR  -c -k -F(ak)(MC -R  D) -MCMf' -MC(R  Df(aM) -c(kMR +RD)f(ak)) 
dD  MR**' -MR  -c -k -MC -f(ak) -McMf' 
={ >0, when MCMf'>-MC(RDf(aM)  -c(kMR+KD)f(a~)  -MR-c-k-F(a~(MC-R~<O 
<0,  when  MCMf<-MC(RDf(aM)-c(kMR+K~f(a~)-MR-c-k-F(a~(MC-R~<O 
dH  _  =MR (l-F(RL) -c -k -F(ak)) -MR -R  -L(f(RL) +c -k2 -f(ak))  dX  x  x 
dH  dM  dL  _=-MR(F (RL)+c-k-F (ak))+MC(F (aM)-coF (ak))  >  0  =} _=_  >  0  dZ  Z  Z  Z  Z  <  dz  dz  < Appendix 2 
Solutions with weak loan demand 
Alternative constellations 











1.2  MR* =  MRB for some L  OPT  ==>  IlB =  0 and normally B > 0 
























> }  1< L *  2  MR* =  =  RB,when  L=  = L * 
<  > L * 
2.1  MRB > RB  'if B  =  'Ils > 0  =  s = smax 
MR* = MRB  =  ~B  = 0 and normally B > 0 







































o  K+D  K+D+smax 
OPT 
L  = L 
2.2.2  MR~K+D  > RB  =  balance sheet: L  OPT =  K+D 
B 
R 
L-________________________  -+____ L 
o  K+D 
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